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Abstract
Time-inconsistent, present-biased agents may hold commitment assets hoping
to keep their current and future present bias in check. Paternalistic governments,
in an effort to help such people, routinely offer commitment machinery such as
restrictions (or bans) on early withdrawals from defined-contribution, retirement
schemes. The larger literature on low uptake of commitment assets recognizes a
trade-off: while use of commitment technologies thwarts deviation from pre-selected
paths, they, nevertheless, limit flexibility of future selves to respond to unantici-
pated, consumption shocks. This paper rules out consumption or income shocks
by design and yet uncovers a similar trade-off in a world where agents are uncertain
but hold beliefs, possibly incorrect, about the present-biasedness of future selves. It
shows how fully sophisticated agents – those with correct beliefs about the present-
bias of future selves – are happier when the government offers tighter commitment;
this is not necessarily so, for the partially naive. Indeed, the latter may be happier
than their fully sophisticated counterparts if the government’s commitment ma-
chinery is slack.
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1 Introduction
People in their fifties, for whom retirement is looming, often find themselves in the fol-
lowing predicament. Even as they develop the best intentions of wanting to save for the
post retirement years, they confront current consumption demands that simply can-
not wait. Many are self aware enough to realize that the supposed “can’t-wait” imme-
diacy of current consumption may reappear in the early retirement years. At that time,
the trip to Italy would, again, likely not wait. And it will be paid for by eating into re-
tirement savings (or borrowing against them) thereby jeopardizing consumption dur-
ing the late retirement years. This paper studies the problem of people who are in the
above-described quandary and are looking for outside help.1 Specifically, it asks, how
should such middle-aged people, with varying degrees of self-awareness or sophistica-
tion about their present-bias, invest their savings so as to, both, finance current grati-
fication and thwart their early-retirement self from impoverishing their late-retirement
self?
At first glance, it would appear that self aware people in such situations ought to seek
out commitment devices that lock in saving to prevent “overspending” or borrowing
by their future, recently-retired selves.2 Governments, acting in a paternalistic fashion,
routinely offer such commitment machinery to help such people out. These include,
for example, restrictions (or bans) on early withdrawals from defined contribution (DC)
retirement schemes (Beshears et al. 2015a). A germane example is the U.K. where, up
until recently, residents on money-purchase pension schemes were forced to take an an-
nuity – the income guaranteed by pension providers in exchange for receiving all or part
of the funds in their pension pot. Additionally, a 55% tax rate was imposed on anyone
who took out more than 25% of the savings in their pension pot.3 In the U.S., retire-
ment savings accounts are partially illiquid: withdrawals before age 5912 incur a 10% tax
1There is another branch of the literature that studies the role of inside commitment devices (broadly,
choice-set restrictions) such as “personal budgeting” which involves “grouping expenses into categories
and constraining each with an implicit or explicit cap applied to a specified time period” (Galperti, 2019).
Our focus is entirely on the use of outside commitment machinery whereby agents lock in their saving into
specific assets of varying liquidity.
2Rarely are these devices provided by the market. As Kocherlakota (2001) argues, good commitment
assets, by their very nature, are hard to sell and hard to use as collateral.
3In Singapore, those turning 55 after 2012 may roughly withdraw upto S$5,000 of their Central Prov-
ident Fund (CPF) balances; remainder is paid out as an annuity beginning at the drawdown age of 64.
See Beshears et al. (2015a) for a comprehensive look at the liquidity provisions embedded in the various
employer-based defined contribution (DC) retirement savings systems of rich nations.
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penalty. Critics argue such restrictions on the liquidity of retirement savings hurt those
who must “respond to pre-retirement events that raise the marginal utility of consump-
tion, like medical emergencies or income shocks” (Beshears et al. 2015b). Others point
out that such limitations reduce the scope for “behavioral mistakes”. In this paper, we
study the optimal usage of commitment devices by self-aware, present-biased agents
and the restrictions on early withdrawal of their retirement savings.
To that end, we employ ideas about present-biasedness and associated self-awareness
popular in the literature. From Chetty (2015), we adopt a) the notion that individuals are
comprised of multiple selves, possibly in conflict with one another, and b) the construct
of a rift between a self’s “true preferences” (experienced utility), that which she uses to
determine how much she should save, versus her “choice” or “behavioral” preferences
(decision utility), that which determines how much she actually saves. The latter can
help rationalize the gap between actual and best-intention saving if, for example, the
choice preferences of the current self attach a lower weight on future utility than her
true preferences do – this is present-bias from the standpoint of the true self. Likewise,
there may be disagreements – preference reversal – between the choice preferences of
the current middle-aged self and her future retired selves. Time-inconsistent prefer-
ences (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) help explain the gap between what the current,
decision-making self wishes a future self to save and what that self, when her turn to
decide arrives, actually does.
Much depends on the self-awareness of the current self. Following O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001), we allow for partial naivete (sophistication) where the current self has be-
liefs about the time preference of future selves that are, in principle, different from the
actual preference of the latter. This means the agent is aware she will have to wrestle
with self-control problems in the future but is not fully aware of their magnitude. The
more aware an yet-to-retire self is of the impending preference reversal, the more so-
phisticated she is, and the stronger her desire to protect the consumption possibilities
of her late-retirement self. This is precisely when commitment devices are sought.
We cast these ideas in the context of a simple lifecycle model in which a time-inconsistent
agent lives for three periods, middle-aged, old, and very old. She has access to two safe
saving instruments, a liquid one-period asset with return, R1 = R > 1 and a two-period
asset with return R2 = R2 (if liquidated after two periods) and a return (1− θ)R (if re-
traded, i.e., liquidated after one period) where θ is an early-withdrawal (tax) penalty im-
posed by the government. (Alternatively, one may think of θ as a short-cut measure of
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interest loss due to re-trading or credit frictions.) By choosing a portfolio of these as-
sets, the middle-aged self makes a commitment towards retirement consumption. The
strength of this commitment depends on whether her future, just-retired self will/can
undo her plans by liquidating some of her two-period asset holding. The following mar-
gins are at play. First, the yet-to-retire self is herself present-biased but is also concerned
about retirement consumption. Second, depending on how sophisticated she is, she in-
corporates her perception of the choices to be made by her just-retired, present-biased
self which likely differ from the actual choices the latter will make. The yet-to-retire
self may find it desirable to give up some current utility so as to pass on more wealth
to her just-retired self. This would indulge the latter’s present bias, thwart premature
liquidation, and in the process, protect her late-retirement self. Or, should she allow
her just-retired self to liquidate early? Which is the better strategy, from the perspec-
tive of the middle-aged self’s choice and true utility? What, then, is the “optimal” θ?
While higher penalties may reduce premature withdrawals, could they discourage sav-
ing thereby sabotaging the aim of raising net savings? More generally, is a “stronger”
commitment technology (larger costs of deviating from full commitment) always wel-
fare improving?
Intuitively, the more naive a person is, the less their demand for commitment. Such
a person is mostly unaware of their impending preference reversal and do not feel a
strong need to protect against it. For such a person, higher θ (higher early-withdrawal
penalties) may improve their choice utility. We go on to show that, for partially-naive
individuals, a higher θ is not necessarily welfare improving from a true utility perspec-
tive. Clearly, credit frictions provide an important societal benefit because their pres-
ence makes it harder for future selves to borrow/liquidate, and hence finance a devia-
tion from previously made plans. This is why more sophisticated agents like higher θ.
What is somewhat striking is that, for low θ, agents with some naivete may be happier
from a true utility perspective than their fully sophisticated counterparts!
Our paper is part of a long line of research – Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollack (1968),
Laibson (1997, 1998) and the review by Bryan, Karlan, and Nelson (2010) – studying
the demand for commitment among present-biased individuals; specifically, what is
the optimal savings rule in models where people are tempted to consume earlier than
what their best-intention plans suggest? In particular, Laibson (1997) and others have
emphasized how sophistication can lead people to invest heavily in illiquid assets as
a commitment device. Even though evidence of non-experimental evidence for a de-
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mand for commitment is somewhat sketchy (Laibson, 2015), there is general appreci-
ation that these notions, nevertheless, can improve our understanding of saving be-
havior. Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) explain low demand for commitment
by pointing to the fact that uncertainty about future consumption needs (due to taste
and income shocks) generates a countervailing demand for flexibility. Beshears et al.
(2015b) extend their results to show that sophisticated agents invest more in commit-
ment accounts that are more illiquid even when there is a demand for flexibility due
to uninsurable taste shocks. Our paper is also thematically connected to John (2019)
which highlights the argument that commitment may be welfare improving if an agent
can “anticipate how her future selves will behave” and that “adopting a commitment de-
vice that is ill-suited to one’s preferences may backfire and become a threat to welfare.”
In our case, too strict a level of commitment may be incompatible with one’s beliefs
about the present-biasedness of their future selves.
Our paper generates a demand for flexibility not via unforeseen (but insurable) shocks
but by allowing for agents to form beliefs about the present-biasedness of their future
selves. As such, in our setup, it matters how sophisticated an agent is, meaning how
aware she is of the possibility that she may be about to relinquish control over her re-
tirement consumption to her immediate future self who, in turn, may prioritize her own
utility over that of an even later self thereby hurting the current decisionmaker. By tying
her hands completely, she may get hurt, not because she may get hit with a taste/income
shock, but because her future self may untie those hands unless the cost of doing so is
prohibitive. In a way, our paper informs the larger literature on low uptake of commit-
ment assets (Laibson, 2015) by adding another possible reason for this observed behav-
ior: agents may shy away from buying commitment not because they seek flexibility to
handle taste or budget shocks but because they may not have accurate beliefs about the
extent of present biasedness of their future selves.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model econ-
omy, the primitives and the agent choice sets. Section 3 considers the perceived and
actual choices by the middle-aged and the old, while Section 4 studies the effect of
the strength of the commitment technology on true and choice welfare. Section 5 con-
cludes. Proofs are contained in the appendices.
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2 The model
Consider an economy with a unit mass of agents who live through three time periods
– middle-aged (m), old (o) and very old (v). Agents receive an endowment, w, only as
middle-aged and must save to provide for consumption when old and very old.
2.1 Preferences
Agents may have both myopic and quasi-hyperbolic preferences (exhibiting time-inconsistent
behavior), and as such, we distinguish between their “true” and “choice” utility see e.g.
Chetty (2015). Agents’ behavior is dictated by their choice utility, but their actual well-
being is governed by their true lifetime utility. Let cm denote consumption as middle-
aged, co denote consumption as old, and cv be consumption as very old. The felicity
function u (·) is assumed to fulfill standard assumptions, including uc (·) > 0, ucc (·) < 0
and Inada conditions. For some specific results we assume a CES form, i.e., u (c) =
c1−σ−1
1−σ , σ > 0.
The “true” life-time preferences, with a “*”, defined over consumption in each period
of life is given by
(1) Ω∗ ≡ u(cm) + β∗δ∗ [u(co) + δ∗u(cv)]
where δ∗ ∈ [0, 1] is the true discount factor and β∗ is a parameter. The life-time choice
preferences when middle-aged are given as
(2) Ωm ≡ u (cm) + βδ [u (co) + δu (cv)]
and of when old as
(3) Ωoa ≡ u (co) + βδu (cv)
where δ is the actual discount factor. If δ = δ∗ and β = β∗, then true and choice pref-
erences coincide. If δ < δ∗ but β = β∗ = 1, the agent’s choice suffers from myopia. If
δ = δ∗ and β < 1, her preferences exhibit preference reversal. The parameter β < 1 thus
represents quasi-hyperbolic preferences which generate time inconsistency (preference
reversal) since the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption as old and
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|old= − uc(co)βδuc(cv) from the point of view of the old – see Laibson (1997). Clearly, for
δ = δ∗ and β < β∗ < 1, her choice preferences show no myopia (but does show prefer-
ence reversal) and shows more present bias than her true self. In short, for δ < δ∗ and
β = 1, there is myopia and no preference reversal, and for δ = δ∗ and β < 1 preference
reversal but no myopia. Henceforth, without loss of generality, we set β∗ = 1. In that
case, the true preferences can written as
Ω∗ ≡ u(cm) + δ∗ [u(co) + δ∗u(cv)]
Ω∗o ≡ u(co) + δ∗u(cv)
Ω∗v ≡ u(cv)
Here on, our yardstick of welfare will be Ω∗.
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), we allow for partial naivete (sophistica-
tion) where the middle-aged have beliefs/perceptions (βp) about the time-preference of
the old that are, in principle, different from the old’s actual preference (β):
(4) Ωop ≡ u (co) + βpδu (cv) ,
where β ≤ βp ≤ 1. When βp = β, the agent is fully sophisticated and when βp = 1, the
agent is fully naive. When β < βp < 1, the agent is aware that she has future self-control
problems, but underestimates their magnitude. Importantly, the middle-aged perceive
that their behavior as old is governed by (4) while in actuality it is determined by (3).
Our description thus far can also be understood in terms of a model of multiple selves
where future selves may behave differently than what the current self anticipates and
finds optimal.
Of interest are two margins. The first is in the current, the consumption allocation
between the middle-aged and the future (u(cm) vs. u(co) + δu(cv)). The second is in
the future, the consumption allocation between old and very old age (u (co) vs. u (cv)).
The first margin grapples with present bias captured by βδ < δ∗. The second one, in
addition, must incorporate the idea of incorrect beliefs or partial naivete, βp ≥ β. Figure
1 illustrates.
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Figure 1: Indifference curves (co, cv) – true, perceived, and choice preferences
The true preferences of the middle aged over co and cv are shown by the solid black
indifference curve based on the discount factor δ∗. The old’s actual choices regarding co
and cv are made with a discount factor βδ < δ∗ and lie on the yellow dashed line which
is steeper than the solid curve. The middle-aged’s actual choices follow the red dotted
line. She perceives that, as old, her decisions regarding co and cv will be made based on
the black dashed indifference curve since βpδ ≥ βδ (βpδ < δ∗).
2.1.1 Commitment technology/illiquidity
Much like in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the middle-aged agent can save in two safe as-
sets – a one-period asset with a gross, one-period return R1 and a two-period asset with
a two-period return of R2. Without loss of generality, assume R1 = R and R2 = R2. The
middle-aged makes a personal commitment on consumption as old and very old, re-
spectively, via holdings of these two assets. How strong the commitment is will depend
on whether the later self as old will/can undo it by partial liquidation of the two-period
asset. The government also helps determine the strength of the commitment technol-
ogy (parameterized by θ; the higher θ, the stronger the commitment technology). For
concreteness, think of θ a tax penalty on early liquidation of the two-period asset such
that the after-tax, one-period return on the two-period asset is (1− θ)R. Clearly, if θ → 1
there is full commitment. For completeness, note that the old, if they so wish, can make
additional savings at the rate R.
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Our formalization is sparse and stylized so as to permit singular focus on the issue at
hand. While we describe θ as a tax penalty above, one may re-interpret our formulation
as an exogenously specified characterization of market frictions (with θ capturing some
sort of dead-weight loss). First, think of annuities. Suppose πo is probability of reaching
old age and πv is the probability for an old agent to reach very old age. Then, we may
define Ωm ≡ u(cm)+δβπo [u(co) + βπvu(cv)] while Ωop continues to be defined by (4) and
Ωoa by (3) with πo and πv added. An annuity delivering one unit of consumption in case
of survival has a so-called fair price q = πR <
1
R where R is the gross real return to a safe,
one-period bond. The gross rate of return on the annuity is the inverse of the price, i.e.,
R
π . If there are annuities that are bought in middle-age and pay out 1 unit when old and
1 unit when very old, under complete markets, the price of the former is πoR , and that of
the latter is πoπv
R2
. Finally, an annuity that is bought when old and pays 1 unit when very
old is priced at πvR . In this case, one can easily redefine R1 =
R
πo




in that case, would be a penalty (sold at a discount) imposed by the annuity market for
early liquidation of the two-period annuity. Alternatively, consider a setup in which an
old agent may borrow against future wealth at the rate Rb > R where the gap (Rb −R)
is akin to θ; the higher the gap (Rb −R) , the harder it is for the old to borrow and undo
the plans of the middle-aged, hence easier for the latter to achieve commitment.
2.1.2 Budget constraints
The budget constraint for the middle-aged readsw = cm+so+sv = cm+sm where sv(so)
is saving in the two (one) period asset and total saving, sm is sm ≡ so + sv. For the old,
the holdings of assets (so and sv) are predetermined. Define b as the portion of the very
old savings (sv) liquidated by the old. In this case, the budget constraint is
co = Rso + (1− θ)Rb; 0 < b < sv(5)
cv = R
2 (sv − b)(6)
The old, in addition to sv, may also choose to save for very old age (b ≤ 0)
co = Rso +Rb,(7)
cv = R





co + (1− θ) cvR = Rso + (1− θ)Rsv for co > Rso (b > 0)
co +
cv
R = Rso +Rsv for co ≤ Rso (b ≤ 0)
.
This defines the budget set in the (co, cv) space, illustrated in Figure 2. For all co ≤ Rso,
the budget line is AC with slope−R but for co > Rso, the budget line is CD with a steeper
slope− R1−θ – there is a kink at C.
Figure 2: Budget set - consumption when old and very old (co, cv)
Notice, early liquidation as old implies an allocation on the segment CD, which lies en-
tirely inside of the segment AB. Such a move, to foreshadow, would hurt the middle-aged
by lowering life-time welfare. The middle-aged would like to thwart this and commit to
choices of so and sv so as to keep the old on the segment ACB if possible (by “moving”
point C toward B). However, the actual budget constraint for the old is ACD with θ de-
termining the cost of deviating from the plan set by the middle-aged. The middle-aged
understands the role of θ and also perceives (βp ≤ 1) her old self’s desire to be on the
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segment CD. Her perception may, of course, be wrong. These struggles form the subject
matter of the rest of the paper.
3 Middle-aged savings and asset allocation
To determine the saving decision made as middle-aged, the usual backward induction
method is applied. Bear in mind that partial naivete means decisions made by the
middle-aged depend on her incorrect perception of the preferences her old self will use
to make choices. Further below, we also study the actual decisions made when old.
3.1 What the middle-aged perceives her old self will choose
Define bp as the middle-aged’s perception of how much the old will liquidate. Given yet-




Ωop = u (co) + β
pδu (cv)
s.t.




R = Rso +Rsv for co ≤ Rso (bp ≤ 0).
The solution is summarized as follows:
(10)





uc (Rso + (1− θ)Rbp)
βpδuc (R2 (sv − bp))
= R1−θ




bp < 0 if
uc (Rso)
βpδuc (R2sv)
< R bp :
uc (Rso +Rb
p)
βpδuc (R2 (sv − bp))
= R
For given (so, sv), there exist critical levels for so – so and so – such that the middle-
aged believes that her old self will i) liquidate (bp > 0) if so < so, ii) neither liquidate nor







R2 (sm − so)
)
,(11)
uc (Rso) ≡ Rβpδuc
(




Of paramount importance will be the situation in which the middle-aged chooses so <
so (“too low” a saving in the one-period asset). Think of so as the upper bound level of
middle-age saving which keeps her old self from liquidating some of sv.



























pδucc (R2 (sm − so))












pδucc (R2 (sm − so))
< 0.(15)
Both higher θ and higher βp reduce so, the lower bound saving in the one-period asset.
The intuition is that a higher θ makes it more costly for the old to liquidate part of sv; this
help to prevent the old from deviating at even lower levels of so than before. A higher βp
(more strongly naive) means the less the middle-aged believes the old will liquidate.
3.2 The best-intention plans of the middle-aged
According to the choice utility of middle-aged, eq. (2), the best-intention plans of the
middle-aged take sm as predetermined for the old and maximize [u (co) + δu (cv)]. Such
plans are described by
(16) uc (Rŝo) ≡ Rδuc
(
R2 (sm − ŝo)
)
.
The ideal is to have consumption ĉo = Rŝo as old and ĉv = R2 (sm − ŝo) as very old. Put
differently, if the middle-aged were to hold (so, sv) = (ŝo, sm − ŝo) satisfying (16), her
welfare would be highest. Notice, because it is the best-intention plan, ŝo(·) does not






R2 (sm − ŝo)
)
ucc(Rŝo) +R2δucc (R2 (sm − ŝo))
∈ (0, 1) .
Leaving a higher sm for the old would raise ĉo = Rŝo and ĉv = R2 (sm − ŝo) since ∂ŝo(·)∂sm ∈
(0, 1) . The crucial question is, does the middle-aged perceive that were she to choose
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so = ŝo and ŝv = (sm − ŝo) , the old would not try to undo it? In other words, is her
best-intention plan (so, sv) = (ŝo, sm − ŝo) implementable or foolproof?
To begin with, ŝo, since it will be chosen based on her choice preferences which in-
clude her perceptions, must satisfy so ≤ so ≤ so as defined in (11) and (12); otherwise,
the old will revise her plans by premature liquidation or by adding on saving. We say ŝo is
perceived to be implementable if so ≤ ŝo ≤ so. If ŝo < so, the plan is not implementable
since the old will wish to liquidate early. Similarly, if ŝo > so, the plan is again not imple-
mentable since the old will wish to save additional amounts. Both early liquidation and
extra saving decisions depend crucially on βp and θ. Using (11), (12), and (16), it follows
ŝo (·) R so (·) for θ R 1− βp,
ŝo (·) ≤ so (·) (equality holds iff βp = 1).
It can be shown that
Lemma 1 For given sm, the optimal asset allocation, and thus the level of savings for old
age, so (sm), is
(17) so(sm) =
{
so (sm) for θ ≤ 1− βp
ŝo(sm) for θ > 1− βp
and sv(sm) = sm − so(sm).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 lays out the optimal choices of asset holdings by the middle-aged as func-
tions of θ and βp. Recall, so must exceed so otherwise the old will prematurely liquidate.
For θ > 1 − βp, luckily, there is no implementation problem. Early liquidation is so ex-
pensive that the old is perceived to not to want to deviate; in this case, so(sm) = ŝo(sm)
obtains, the best intention plans are implementable.
For θ ≤ 1−βp perceived liquidation as old constrains the options open to the middle-
aged. Now, so must be set so high (= so) as to, again, prevent any liquidation when
old (ŝo(sm) ≤ so (sm) for θ ≤ 1 − βp). Choosing a lower so (including ŝo(sm)) would
induce some liquidation which is not optimal. The perceived threat of plan revision by
the old along with low-strength outside commitment really hurts the middle aged. This
is precisely where high θs help. Notice, how the perceived present bias as old, βp, plays
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a somewhat similar role as θ. A sufficiently low βp – stronger perceived present bias –
makes the implementation constraint binding.
To interpret the case θ ≤ 1 − βp, assume for a moment that the old is perceived to
liquidate bp > 0. As discussed earlier, this hurts the middle-aged in utility terms – a
loss of utility from being forced “off” the budget constraint ACB in Figure 2. Intuitively,
the middle aged may agree to trade off some current utility if it allows her to thwart her
future self from liquidating. This could, for example, be achieved if the middle-aged
“endows” the old with more so so as to counteract the old’s present bias and put brakes
on her desire to liquidate. To that end, consider the possibility that the middle-aged
allocates more to old age so +x such thatR (so + x) = Rso + (1− θ)Rbp ensuring the old
gets exactly the same consumption as when she liquidates bp. This extra x is generated
by taking it away from sv. In other words, the new package has (so + x, sv − x) with x =
(1− θ) bp. Under this package, the old has co = Rso+(1− θ)Rbp and the very old has cv =
R2 (sv − x) = R2 (sv − (1− θ) bp) > R2 (sv − bp). In short, the new package leaves the old
with the same consumption and the very old with higher consumption compared to the
consumption bundle achieved by liquidating at cost θ. Clearly, choice life-time utility
of the middle-aged is higher with the new package. Essentially, the intuition is that it is
cheaper for the middle-aged to do the liquidating on behalf of the old (to help with the
latter’s present bias) than it is for the old to liquidate (1 vs 1− θ).
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Figure 3: Implementation under perceived present-bias as old
Figure 3 illustrates this argument. Assume, the middle-aged chooses the initial pack-
age (so, sv) implying a consumption bundle (Rso, R2sv) because that places him on the
segment AB at point I. Such a package is not implementable as the old reoptimizes and
move to point II (which, because of the old’s present bias) has more co and less cv than
under the initial package. The new package, (so+x, sv−x) with x = (1− θ) bp, places the
old at III, on a higher indifference curve from the perspective of the old’s lifetime choice
utility. It offers the middle aged both higher true and choice utility than at II. Hence, the
middle-aged chooses so so as to be on the AB segment. Importantly, this choice of so is
based on the perception of the preferences of the old, and it may, of course, be wrong.
3.2.1 The savings decision by the middle-aged
Having settled on how a given savings level is allocated between the two assets so (sm)
and sv (sm) = sm − so (sm), we turn to the optimal savings decision (sm) for the middle-
aged. Lifetime choice utility is
Ωm = u (w − sm) + βδ
[
u (Rso (sm)) + δu
(
R2 (sm − so (sm))
)]
15
where so (sm) is determined from (17). The optimal sm, thus, satisfies
(18)
uc (w − sm) = βδ2R2uc
(




uc (Rso (sm))− δRuc
(




Note, for θ > 1− βp, we have so (sm) = ŝo (sm). Using (16), eq. (18) reduces to
(19) uc (w − ŝm) = βδ2R2uc
(
R2 (ŝm − ŝo (ŝm))
)
for θ > 1− βp,
where ŝm denotes the savings level as middle-aged when ŝo (sm) can be implemented.
This is also the savings level preferred by the middle-aged. When θ ≤ 1 − βp, we have
so (sm) = so (sm). Using (14) and notinguc (Rso) ≡ R1−θβ
pδuc
(








(20) uc (w − sm) ≤ βδ2R2uc
(
R2 (sm − so (sm))
)
for θ ≤ 1− βp,
where sm denotes the savings level by the middle-aged when the implementation con-
straint (so = so (sm)) is binding.
For the two key variables, θ and βp, it is hard to find general comparative static results
but it is possible to establish the following:
Lemma 2 When θ < 1 − βp and the implementation constraint is binding, the saving
as middle-aged (sm) depends on the liquidating cost (θ) and the perceived present biased
of the old (βp), but the effects are generally ambiguously signed. For CRRA-utility u (c) =
c1−σ−1






































= sign (1− σ) .
When θ ≥ 1− βp saving as middle-aged (ŝm) is unaffected by θ and βp.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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From standard, two-period saving models, it is well-known that σ Q 1 determines
whether the substitution or income effect of a change in the (effective) rate of return,
(1− θ)R, is dominating. We recover a similar condition here for θ and βp although the
effects of an interest change is, in general, ambiguous. The complication arises here be-
cause sm depends on the saving decision made as old. Recall, when θ rises reducing the
effective interest rate, the old will attempt to front load consumption by cutting saving
if σ < 1. Hence, if relative risk aversion is below one (σ < 1), a lower θ and a lower βp
both reduce saving made as middle-aged. A low θ increases the incentive of the old to
liquidate so as to front load consumption, and the middle-aged responds to this by sav-
ing less. Similary, a lower βp increases the perception (the firmness of the belief) that
the old will front load consumption, and therefore the middle-aged saves less. Either
change reduces the tensions arising from the implementation problem prompting the
middle-aged to transfer less resources to the later self.
From Lemma 2, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The commitment problem arises for θ ≤ 1− βp and
(i) if σ < 1, the commitment problem reduces total saving of the middle-aged, that is
sm < ŝm;
(ii) if σ > 1, the commitment problem increases total saving of the middle-aged, that is
sm > ŝm.
Interestingly, the inability to prevent the future self from borrowing (θ ≤ 1 − βp)
makes the middle-aged either save more or less, depending on the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution (1/σ). The intuition is that the commitment problem forces the
middle-aged to choose an asset allocation which is front-loaded (so(sm) > ŝo(sm)) com-
pared to what the middle-aged finds optimal. As a consequence, on the one hand, the
middle-aged finds it less attractive to save, since too much goes to consumption as old
rather than as very old. On the other hand, the middle-aged finds it more attractive to
save, since she wants to protect the very old by leaving more consumption to the very
old. The whole effect on savings depends on which one is dominant.
3.3 The actual choices by the old
The preceding was based on the perception of the middle-aged regarding preferences
of her old self: Eq. (4). Of course, the choices as old are determined by the old’s actual
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choice preferences (3). Recall, limiting cases are when the middle-aged is either sophis-
ticated (βp = β) or completely naive (βp = 1). Notice, since β ≤ βp ≤ 1, the middle-aged
never overestimates the level of present bias. If β < βp, the old has an incentive to front-
load consumption and liquidate some savings intended for the very old, but there will
never be additional savings.
The actual decision taken as old given so (either ŝo (ŝm) or so (sm)) and sv = sm − so
(either ŝm − ŝo (ŝm) or sm − so (sm)), is the solution to the problem (ba ≥ 0 always holds)
max
ba
Ωoa = u (cao) + βδu (c
a
v)
cao = Rso + (1− θ)Rba
cav = R
2 (sv − ba)
where the superscript a refers to the actual choices made by the old. It follows straight-
forwardly that
(22)













From (16) and (11), we know that if θ > 1 − βp, uc(Rŝo)
βpδuc(R2ŝv)



























1− θ if θ ≤ 1− β
p.(23)
Combining (22) and (23), it follows that:
(I) θ > 1− β =⇒ θ > 1− βp so = ŝo (ŝm) ba = 0 sinceRβ <
R
1−θ
(II) 1− βp < θ < 1− β so = ŝo (ŝm) ba > 0 since Rβ ≥
R
1−θ









Lemma 3 (I) θ > 1− β: ba = bp = 0, i.e., actual liquidating is zero as perceived, and pre-
ferred saving levels as middle aged ŝo (ŝm) and ŝv (ŝm) can be implemented. Hence, actual
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consumption when old is as planned/perceived as middle-aged, cao = c
p
o, cav = c
p
v.
(II) 1 − βp < θ ≤ 1 − β: ba > bp = 0, the implementation constraint is perceived to be
non-binding and the middle-aged chooses an asset allocation (so, sv) = (ŝo (ŝm) , ŝv (ŝm))
and saving level ŝm under the perception that there will be no liquidation by the old. How-
ever, in actuality, the old liquidates, and therefore, ba > bp = 0, cao > c
p
o, and cav < c
p
v.
(III) θ ≤ 1− βp: ba > bp = 0, the implementation constraint is perceived to be binding
and the middle-aged chooses an asset allocation (so, sv) = (so (sm) , sv (sm)) and saving
level sm. The old liquidates and therefore, b
a > bp = 0, cao > c
p
o, and cav < c
p
v.
The possible outcome regimes are shown in Figure 4. In regime I, there is no devi-
ation from the perceived choices. Regime II and III share the feature that the middle-
aged’s perception that her old self will not liquidate is proven to be wrong: in actuality,
her old self does liquidate some of the saving intended for the very old. The two regimes
differ in the following way. In case II, the middle-age perceives the liquidating cost to be
high enough to prevent the old from liquidating, so the ideal asset allocation was cho-
sen (the “first best”: ŝm, ŝo (ŝm) and ŝv (ŝm)) as in case I. In regime III, the middle-age
perceives that the most preferred plan is not implementable, and therefore chooses the
“second best” (sm, so (sm) and sv (sm)); however, the incentive for the old to liquidate is
underestimated, so there is deviation from her “second best” plan.
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Figure 4: Regimes for actual choices - liquidating cost (θ) and perceived present bias
(βp)
3.4 Numerical illustration
To see more clearly how βp and θ influence the actual outcomes, we present some nu-
merical results for u (c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ (σ > 0) ; see Figure 5. The following parameter values
are used: σ = 0.3, β = 0.3, R = 2, w = 1, δ∗ = 0.8, and δ = 0.7; for these values,
regime I (θ > 1 − β) arises for θ > 0.7. We consider five values of βp; the lowest value
(βp = 0.3) corresponds to a fully sophisticated agent, and the highest value (βp = 1)
to a fully naive agent. Figure 5 shows how actual savings (and hence, consumption) as
middle-aged, liquidation by the old, consumption as old and consumption as very old
depend on the costs of liquidation (θ). Observe that as the strength of the commitment
technology starting from θ = 0 increases, first regime III prevails (θ < 1− βp for βp < 1),
then 1−βp < θ < 1−β we enter regime II, and eventually for θ > 1−β,we are in regime
I.
With σ < 1, for a given θ, when both in regime III, saving as middle-aged is higher
(and consumption lower), the more “naive” the agent (higher βp). For a given degree of
naivete, middle-aged saving is increasing in θ, and for sufficiently high θ, the commit-
ment problem disappears (regime II and I where the commitment constraint is perceived
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not binding is reached). Note that, as shown in Proposition 1, when σ < 1, middle-aged
saving is lower when θ < 1 − βp. As expected, liquidation is larger, the more naive the
agent is. Interestingly, the level of liquidation is increasing in the liquidation cost up
to some critical level (which, itself, is decreasing in βp). This should be seen in combi-
nation with the fact that middle-aged saving is increasing in the liquidation costs (see
Figure 5a). Consumption as old is generally higher (frontloading old vs very old), the
more naive the agent is. The consumption level is non-monotone in the strength of
the commitment technology. Recall the consumption effect is determined by (1 − θ)ba,
hence even though ba is increasing in θ, consumption may not be. Consumption as
very-old is not unambiguously higher for less naive agents, but it is generally increas-
ing in the strength of the commitment technology. The non-monotone responses of
consumption to the strength of the commitment technology are interesting findings
challenging the general perception that stronger commitments technologies counter-
acts the implications of present-biased preferences. The reason for the non-monotone
responses is the strategic interaction between the different selves as explained above.
The non-monotone responses are also important for interpretations of the empirical
evidence on the importance of commitment technologies, see discussion above.
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Figure 5: Savings, liquidation and consumption as a function of liquidation costs (θ)
for different values of βp.
4 Welfare
How does welfare depend on the strength of the commitment mechanism? This ques-
tion can be addressed both in terms of choice utility (Ωm) and true utility (Ω∗) as middle-
aged. We consider them in turn. Recall, we have already established that a sufficiently
high liquidating cost, θ ≥ 1 − β, implies that the middle-aged can make commitments
which are not undone by the old (corresponding to case I in Figure 4). Neither Ωm nor
Ω∗ depend on θ in this case. Put differently, for a sufficiently high liquidating cost, there
is no commitment problem.
The following considers the outcomes for θ < 1 − β where both the implementa-
tion problem and the importance of the distinction between the perceived and actual
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behavior, cf. case II and III in Figure 4.
4.1 Commitment and choice utility as middle-aged
In regime II (1 − βp ≤ θ < 1 − β) the implementation constraint is perceived to be
non-binding so the choice utility as middle-aged (Ωm) is unaffected by θ. Regime III (θ <
1−βp) is slightly less straightforward. The choice utility as middle-aged (Ωm) depending
on the perceived choices (cpm, c
p
o = Rso, c
p
v = R2sv) and (2) can be written as
Ωm (θ) = u (w − sm (θ)) + βδ
[
u (Rso (θ, sm (θ))) + δu
(
R2 (sm (θ)− so (θ, sm (θ)))
)]
,
where so (θ, sm (θ)) is determined by (11) and sm (θ) by (18). By standard envelope argu-






























1−θ − 1 < 0 and
∂so
∂θ < 0 cf. (13), it follows that
∂Ωm
∂θ > 0. Hence, we have
Proposition 2 Choice utility as middle-aged (Ωm) is I) increasing in the liquidating cost,
∂Ωm
∂θ > 0 for θ < 1− β
p, and II) unaffected by the liquidating cost, ∂Ω
m
∂θ = 0 for θ ≥ 1− β
p.
The intuition is straightforward. In regime III (θ < 1 − βp) a higher liquidating cost
increases the cost of deviating from the plan made as middle-aged, and therefore choice
utility increases. For θ ≥ 1− βp the old is perceived to follow the plans made as middle-
aged and hence choice utility is unaffected by θ.
4.2 Commitment and true utility as middle-aged
Turn next to the effects of the strength of the commitment technology on true utility.
Under true utility, (1), with β∗ = 1, the marginal rates of substitution between the two
margins – middle-aged and old, old and very-old – are the same and equal Rδ∗, and the
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4.2.1 Regime I: θ ≥ 1− β
In this case the actual consumptions are as planned at middle-aged by the choice utility
(2). The marginal rates of substitution between the two margins are given by
uc (w − ŝm)
uc (Rŝo)







uc (R2 (ŝm − ŝo))






i.e., there is front loading of consumption both between middle-aged and old, and old
and very-old. This is a standard result. Hence, even though there is no commitment
problem, life-time true utility is lowered due to myopia and preference reversal.
4.2.2 Regime II: 1− βp ≤ θ < 1− β
In this case, the marginal rates of substitution are
uc (w − ŝm)
uc (Rŝo + (1− θ)Rba)
>
uc (w − ŝm)
uc (Rŝo)
= βRδ < Rδ∗,
uc (Rŝo + (1− θ)Rba)
uc (R2 (ŝv − ba))
=
β
1− θRδ < Rδ < Rδ
∗.
Now the present bias is worsened between old and very old, due to the liquidating
made by the old. Recall, in this case the middle-aged did not perceive the commitment
constraint to be binding (although it turns out to be the case) and therefore it does not
affect the behavior of the middle-aged . Liquidating means front loading of consump-
tion as old relative to the plan set as middle aged at the cost of consumption as very old;
the costs can thus be assessed in terms of very old age consumption. If the liquidating
cost increases it has counteracting effects discussed above via its direct effect and indi-
rect effect on the amount liquidated. To consider this more specifically note that if the
individual is fully sophisticated (βp = β), this case does not arise. The following thus
assumes βp > β. Recall, in case II, the implementation constraint is not perceived to
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be binding (hence so = ŝo (ŝm)) and no liquidating is perceived (bp = 0), but the old is
actually going to liquidate (ba > 0). In this case, the true utility (1) can be written as
Ω∗ = u (w − ŝm) + δ∗
[
u (Rŝo (ŝm) + (1− θ)Rba) + δ∗u
(
R2 (ŝm − ŝo (ŝm)− ba)
)]
,











= −δ∗uc (Rŝo (ŝm) + (1− θ)Rba)Rba
+δ∗
[
uc (Rŝo (ŝm) + (1− θ)Rba) (1− θ)R− δ∗R2uc
(


















R2 (ŝm − ŝo (ŝm)− ba)
)
.
It can be easily shown that dΩ
∗







δ∗ − βδ > 0.
Two effects are at play. A higher liquidating cost may make the old liquidate more or
less. If the old liquidates less (∂b
a
∂θ < 0), it would increase consumption as very old and
this is welfare improving. But a higher θ increases the costs of deviation which lowers
welfare. We have










δ∗ − βδ > 0.
For CRRA utility, there exist a unique θ̃ ∈ (1− βp, 1− β) such that ∂Ω
∗(·)
∂θ Q 0 for θ Q θ̃













Proof. See Appendix C.
Also notice that although Ω∗ is not directly affected by βp in regime II, the level of
naivete (βp) matters by affecting the range [1− βp, 1− β] delimiting case II.
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4.2.3 Regime III: θ < 1− βp
In this case, the implementation constraint is binding and affects the behavior of the
middle-aged. We have from (20) (11) and (22) that the marginal rates of substitution are
uc (w − sm)
uc (Rso + (1− θ)Rba)
>






uc (Rso + (1− θ)Rba)
uc (R2 (sv − ba))
=
β
1− θRδ < Rδ < Rδ
∗.
There is still a present bias but between middle-aged and old it can go either way





. There are two countervailing effects. The
commitment problem makes the middle-aged allocate more savings to the old (so (sm) >
ŝo (sm) for the same sm) but also to change savings as middle-aged [see Proposition 2].
We, thus, have an interesting “conflict” between the two margins. The above argument
suggests it is possible true utility can be higher in regime III compared to Regime II, even
though there is a commitment problem in regime III.
In this case, the true utility (1) can be written as
(24) Ω∗ = u (w − sm) + δ∗
[
u (Rso + (1− θ)Rba) + δ∗u
(
R2 (sm − so − ba)
)]
,
where sm, so and b
a are all affected by θ, cf.(18) (11) and (22):
sm = sm (θ) ; so = so (θ, sm (θ)) ; b




= −uc (w − sm)
∂sm
∂θ



























































True life-time utility is affected by the liquidating cost through several channels.
The effect identified in regime II is present via (∂b
a














) create complexities making an-
alytical results difficult to obtain. In general, dΩ
∗
dθ Q 0, but is possible to show that
Proposition 4 For CRRA utility with full sophistication (βp = β), ∂Ω
∗
∂θ > 0 for all θ ≤ 1−β.
That is, in this case the savings effect can never dominate the commitment effect, and true
utility is increasing in θ.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Recall, with full sophistication the preference reversal is perceived, and therefore the
commitment effect is dominating. We illustrate in Figure 6 how true welfare depends on
the strength of the commitment technology for the different cases also used in Figure 6.
First, if agents are sufficiently naive, a non-monotone relationship between true utility
and the strength of the commitment technology arises. Stronger commitment does not
always improve true utility. However, there exists a sufficiently high θ that eliminates the
commitment problem and generates the highest utility. It is also seen that true utility is
not necessarily higher, the less naive the agent is. The richness of the possible outcomes,
even in the CRRA case, also shows why it is difficult to generate analytical results.
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Figure 6: True welfare (Ω∗) and the liquidating cost (θ) for different degrees of per-
ceived present bias (βp)
5 Conclusion
There is a fair bit of evidence indicating that individuals fail to make decisions in a time-
consistent manner. In the context of saving for retirement, researchers observe the all-
too-often failure to provide for retirement. Individuals seem to realize these failures,
but too late. Börsch-Supan, Hurd, and Rohwedder (2016) conducted an Internet sur-
vey among individuals aged 60 and older which show a substantial prevalence of re-
gret over previous saving decisions – 60% of respondents wished that they had saved
more earlier in life. High demand for commitment devices, even costly ones, provides
more evidence to this finding (Rabin, 2013a,b; Beshears, et al., 2015). This paper stud-
ies the adoption and usage of commitment devices by time inconsistent agents. It ask,
how should middle-aged people, with varying degrees of self-awareness or sophistica-
tion about their impending present-bias, invest their savings so as to, both, finance cur-
rent gratification and thwart their early-retirement self from impoverishing their late-
retirement self?
Our analysis generates several rich results. Savings levels are affected by the strength
of the commitment device and the degree of agent sophistication. With a high level
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, saving is lower in the presence of commit-
ment problems, and the downward saving bias is larger, the more naive the agent is.
The liquidation of committed savings is non-monotone in the strength of the commit-
ment device. Likewise old-age consumption level is non-monotone in the strength of
the commitment technology. The non-monotone responses of saving and consump-
tion to the strength of the commitment technology are interesting because they attack
the general perception that stronger commitment technologies counteracts the implica-
tions of present-biased preferences. The reason for the non-monotone responses is the
strategic interaction between the different selves. The non-monotone responses help
reinterpret the empirical evidence on the importance of commitment technologies dis-
cussed in the introduction. The main take-away is that in terms of true utility, agents
are not generally better off with stronger commitment. If agents are sufficiently naive,
a non-monotone relationship between true utility and the strength of the commitment
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technology arises. It is also seen that true utility is not necessarily higher the less naive
the agent is.
Our analysis sheds light on several practical issues pertaining to optimal pension
design. The U.K. mandates discussed in the introduction have been successfully chal-
lenged as being patronizing and perpetrating the view that people cannot be trusted to
invest the funds from their pension pot. The new rules imply that “affluent people ap-
proaching retirement should be free to blow their pension pot on a Lamborghini even
if they end up relying on the state for support.” (The Guardian, 2014) Sceptics at the
time predicted that savers would withdraw unsustainable sums or blow their money on
frivolities. It is too early to say that is not happening. It is true “the majority of with-
drawals were at prudent levels.” (The Telegraph, 2016) but it is not clear whether these
withdrawals are being channeled into long or short term securities.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The middle-aged wants - for given sm - an asset allocation (so, sv) = (ŝo, sm − ŝo) de-
termined by (16). If θ ≥ 1 − βp, so ≤ ŝo ≤ so, and it follows straightforward that it
is perceived to be implementable and hence the optimal choice is so (sm) = ŝo (sm).
However, if θ < 1 − βp, ŝo < so, the ideal allocation (ŝo, sm − ŝo) is not perceived to be
implementable.
Case I: so ≤ so(sm)
In this case, according to (10), the perceived liquidating amount as old, bp ≥ 0, is
determined by
uc (Rso + (1− θ)Rbp)
βpδuc (R2 (sm − so − bp))
=
R
1− θ for so ≤ so(sm)













The utility to the middle-aged of consumption when old and very old isu (Rso + (1− θ)Rbp)+
δu
(






u (Rso + (1− θ)Rbp) + δu
(














δuc (cv) > 0













Case II: so > so(sm)
When so ≤ so ≤ so, bp = 0. The utility to the middle-aged of consumption when old
and very old is u (Rso) + δu
(






u (Rso) + δu
(








since uc (Rŝo) = Rδuc
(
R2 (sm − ŝo)
)
and so > so > ŝo. Hence, for θ ≤ 1−βp, the optimal
choice is so (sm).
B Proof of Lemma 2
When θ > 1 − βp, savings as middle-aged (ŝm) is determined by (19) and (16), and thus
ŝm is unaffected by θ and βp.
When θ ≤ 1− βp, savings as middle-aged (sm) is determined by (18) and (11). Define
κ ≡ β
p
1−θ ≤ 1. Then (11) becomes uc (Rso) = Rδκuc
(
R2 (sm − so)
)
, and assuming CRRA
utility function u (c) = c
1−σ−1

























































































= sign (1− σ) .

















With CRRA utility, we can calculate


















































































































































= sign (Ψ (θ)) .






We first show that ∂Ψ(θ)∂θ > 0 for all σ > 0 (monotonicity).





















and decreasing in θ, and
[




is positive and increasing in θ, so we have
∂Ψ(θ)
∂θ > 0 for 0 < σ ≤ 1.
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since 0 < 1σ < 1, and 0 <
β













> δ∗ − δ > 0,
implying that ∂
∂( β1−θ )
Ψ (θ) > 0, and thus ∂Ψ(θ)∂θ > 0 for σ > 1.
It follows that if Ψ (1− βp) ≥ 0, we always have dΩ∗dθ > 0 over the range of 1−β
p < θ <
1− β. If Ψ (1− βp) < 0, then there exists a θ̃ and a unique local minimum for true utility,
say Ω∗(θ̃), such that ∂Ω
∗(·)
∂θ S 0 for θ S θ̃ . Ψ (1− β
p) < 0 is thus a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a turning point within this range of 1− βp < θ < 1− β.
Turning to the sign of Ψ (1− βp) we have














































D Proof of Proposition 4
Using (25), ∂Ω
∗
∂θ > 0 requires to show for all θ < 1− β,{
(δ∗)2 − βδ2 +
[
(δ∗ − βδ) δ β

















We only need to prove the result in the case where ∂sm∂θ < 0, i.e., σ > 1 with CRRA utility.
So it’s equivalent to show
(δ∗)2 − βδ2 +
[












Define the LHS to be A (θ), and the RHS to be B (θ). With CRRA utility, using (26),
A (θ) =
(δ∗)2 − βδ2 +
[












































































































































































































































































































) > A (θ)
The proposition is proved.
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